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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Within a few decades, the demographic structures of most, if not all, economies will be vastly 
different from today. Advances in medical science will conceivably result in continual 
increases in life expectancy. This resulting rise in longevity will see a greater proportion of 
people making it into higher age brackets. Coupled with the falling fertility rates that have 
been observed for some time, demographic structure are expected to shift towards the aged. 
The macroeconomic impact that ageing brings about cannot be understated. One of the 
channels where demographic structures can exert its influence is through aggregate savings. 
Ageing reducing savings has already been well established in the literature (see de Serres & 
Pelgrin 2003; Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel & Serven 2000). Nonetheless, despite the stylised fact 
that ageing is largely a by-product of both higher life expectancy and falling fertility, the 
direct link between life expectancy and savings has only recently started to come forth within 
the literature through work such as Li, Zhang & Zhang (2007) and Kinugasa & Mason 
(2007). The impact of life expectancy on savings are very different from those of an older 
population structure, yet as life expectancy and aging dependency are highly correlated, 
analysis of the impact of one without due consideration paid to the other is likely to result in 
bias. 
Using a large panel dataset covering 55 countries and data from 1972-2004, this paper sets 
forth to investigate the joint effect of higher age dependency and rising longevity on savings 
through the use of  dynamic panel modelling with Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) 
estimation. The contributions of this paper are threefold. 
Firstly, our model jointly considers the effects of higher age dependency and greater life 
expectancy on savings, thus avoiding potential bias in previous studies that neglect one of the 
two factors. In terms of theoretical foundation, our model is similar to that of Li, Zhang & 
Zhang (2007) and Kinugasa & Mason (2007). What sets this paper apart is its empirical 
approach motivated by our attempt to model the dynamics of savings. The observation that 
savings exerting a fair degree of inertia makes it necessary to distinguish between the long 
and short run impacts. This paper makes this distinction through the use of dynamic panel 
models. 
Secondly, most studies of demographic aged structures on savings tend to focus on either 
national savings or private savings, with public savings largely neglected. This lack of 3 
 
attention on public savings is rather curious considering their potential role in driving growth. 
Furthermore, the more theoretical literature starts to question the exogeneity of public savings 
(Alesina & Drazen 1991: Alesina & Tabellini 1990a and 1990b). Therefore, the other 
contribution of this paper is to include public savings in the analysis alongside private and 
national savings. 
Lastly, theories like the substitutability between private and public expenditure and the 
Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis suggest the potential for changes in public savings to 
crowd out private savings. The Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis in the strictest sense 
predicts that any changes in public savings stemming from changes in tax revenues will be 
offset one for one by private savings, leaving national savings unchanged. If a crowding out 
effect exists, policies aimed at changing the national savings rate should look to alter the 
incentives to save within the private sector. This paper thus also sets forth to analyse to what 
extent any impact ageing has on public savings are offset by responses in private savings. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II gives an overview of the literature. 
Section III and IV offer a discussion of the data and methodology respectively. Section V 
presents and discusses the results. The final section concludes. 
II.  Literature Review 
The Life-Cycle Hypothesis (LCH)
1 suggests that individuals save during their economically 
active years to finance their consumption during retirement (Modigliani & Brumberg 1954). 
Accordingly, increases in the dependency ratio, be it youth or age dependency, will lead to a 
decrease in average private savings. As national savings is largely made up of private 
savings, it is expected that, ceteris paribus, increases in dependency ratios will reduce 
national savings. The seminal work of Leff (1969) found that higher dependency ratios, 
whether be it youth, aged or total dependency, reduced national savings
2. Despite early 
criticisms levelled by Gupta (1971), Goldberger (1973) and Ram (1982), among others, 
subsequent studies tend to support Leff’s conclusions. As indicated in Table 1, there exists 
considerable consensus within the more recent literature that higher dependency acts as a 
drag on savings. 
                                                 
1 The Permanent Income Hypothesis gives essentially the same predictions as the LCH. For simplicity, we only 
refer to the LCH in the paper. 
2 While Leff used national savings, the theoretical underpinnings of his ideas were very much similar to the 
LCH. It was very likely he used national instead of private savings because of the lack of data. 4 
 
[INSERT Table 1]  
Previous work, however, has largely ignored the fact that ageing is brought about by, besides 
falling fertility rates, longer life expectancy. While it is true that higher age dependency 
would increase the number of non-savers relative to savers in the economy, thus bringing 
about a reduction in the private savings rates in aggregation, this idea largely rests upon the 
assumption that although saving rates vary amongst different age groups, the saving rate of 
individual age group remains largely unchanged over different cohorts. Closer examination of 
the LCH suggests that this might not necessarily be the case. Increases in longevity can serve 
as motivation for agents to save more, allowing the financing of a longer retirement. In fact, 
such increases in saving rates may not even be linear. The elderly may be encouraged to save 
even more aggressively, or at least to rundown their assets at a slower rate, since longevity 
brings about more uncertainty of future medical expenses and the risk of outliving one’s 
assets (De Nardi, French & Jones 2009). Furthermore, there is no real reason to still expect 
the retirement age to stay constant if life expectancy increases. Ando et al. (1995), for 
example, found that the elderly in Japan had a high probability of maintaining employment, 
not dissaving as much as theoretical predictions. Work by Ehrlich & Lui (1991), Lee, Zhang 
& Zhang (2003) Lee, Mason & Miller (2003) and Sheshinski (2009) provide theoretical 
support for the positive impact longevity has on private savings. Empirical evidence provided 
by Bloom, Canning & Graham (2003) and Kinugasa & Mason (2007) reaffirms this 
theoretical prediction. 
Since higher age dependency and rising longevity exert opposite effects on private savings, 
the impact of ageing with regards to private savings are therefore equivocal. This ambiguity 
motivated more recent work by Graff, Tang & Zhang (2008) and Li, Zhang & Zhang (2007) 
jointly considering both higher age dependency and rising longevity. 
The link between demography and public savings, in comparison to private and national 
savings studies, is a much neglected field within the literature. In fact the study of public 
savings in general has never gathered much attention (Krieckhaus 2002). Edwards (1996) 
commented that until very recently, the notion of public savings being exogenous was a 
commonplace within the literature. This view has only started to change in the last 20 years, 
with the introduction of theoretical modelling of public savings from a political economy 
perspective (see Alesina & Drazen 1991; Alesina & Tabellini 1990a; Alesina & Tabellini 
1990b for examples). Some recent theoretical studies of demographic change on public 5 
 
expenditure have been framed with such a political economy focus
3. While looking at public 
expenditure, and therefore public savings, through the interaction of ageing and political 
factors is appealing, this would somewhat detract from the focus of the current paper, which 
is simply on how ageing, per se, affects public savings. 
Keeping everything equal, higher age dependency has the potential to reduce productivity, 
and thus the tax base, resulting in lower tax revenues. Higher age dependency also brings 
together the possibility of higher health and social security spending. Taken together, the 
view that higher age dependency will reduce public savings is quite plausible. The potential 
impact of longevity on public savings, however, is not as clear. Bloom et al (2007) showed 
theoretically that for individuals, the optimal response to an exogenous increase in longevity 
was to delay retirement. If this is indeed the case, increased longevity will serve to prop up 
the tax base. In reality, though, this has not been observed. Both Blöndal & Scarpetta  (1998) 
and Duval (2003), studying retirement behaviour in the OECD, found that despite rises in life 
expectancy, social security schemes have actually created incentives for people to retire at the 
same age as a generation ago resulting in longer periods being dependent on the social 
security system.  
Social security spending is not the only form of spending that is projected to rise with ageing. 
In term of health spending, as the elderly people consume more resources than the young, 
gains in life expectancy can be expected to put upward pressure on public expenditure, thus 
lowering public savings. However, the association between higher age dependency and 
longevity on the one side, and increasing public health spending on the other side is not 
definite. Firstly, there is contention whether rising longevity actually means people are 
spending more years in bad health. A study using New Zealand data by Bryant et al. (2004) 
found that it is the time distance to death rather than one’s biological age that acted as a better 
predictor of public health expenditure. They found that while an ageing population can 
reasonably be expected to increase public health expenditure, the increases in health spending 
attributed to just the sheer number of elderly, or higher age dependency, is more modest 
when compared to that attributed to those disabled or requiring specialised aged care. 
Consistent with that view, Cutler & Sheiner (1998) argued that whether ageing increases 
public health expenditure, and so reduces public savings, crucially depended on disability 
rates in the economy, as well as sex and age distributions. These factors act as key 
                                                 
3 See Razin, Sadka & Swagel (2002), Galasso & Profeta (2002) Sanz & Velazquez (2007) among others. 6 
 
considerations when assessing the impact ageing has on public health expenditure. For 
example, living alone increases the likelihood of entering a long term aged care facilities, 
which can act as a drain on public finance. Regardless, projections of public health 
expenditure increasing, at least to some extent, with ageing were put forward by Cutler & 
Sheiner (1998) and Bryant et al.(2004). In contrast, Gouveia (1996) found that public health 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP fell with a higher proportion of aged, suggesting the 
notion that ageing necessarily brings about higher public health expenditure cannot be taken 
uncritically. 
While empirical studies looking at the effect demography itself on public savings are few, 
they do exist. Edwards (1996) found that age dependency had no statistically significant 
effect on public savings in a sample of Latin American countries. However, his methodology 
was handicapped by the estimation procedures that predated the recent developments of 
dynamic panel modelling. Kim & Lee (2008), using a panel VAR approach with G7 countries 
data, found total dependency exerting a negative influence on public savings. The IMF 
(2004) also came to the same conclusion. Disney (2007) showed that the size of the welfare 
state within an OECD sample increases with higher dependency, though the degree of it 
depended on the design of the social security system itself. These studies, however, shared 
something in common; they neglected the role longevity can play in the determination of 
public savings. Untangling the respective impacts of age dependency and longevity on public 
saving could potentially be useful for the design of public policy in dealing with ageing. For 
example, if the dependency ratio is the main cause of the fall in public savings, policy 
regarding immigration and fertility in dealing with the dependency ratio should take priority. 
Alternatively, if longevity exerts a negative impact on public savings, then perhaps there 
should be evaluation of the age threshold for pension and other age-related welfare. 
The preceding discussion focused only on the impact ageing has on private and public 
savings separately. However, is it possible that changes in public savings can crowd out 
private savings leaving national savings unchanged? The 19
th century classical economist 
David Ricardo (1820) first posted a question of this kind in that whether there was a 
difference between funding a war with a one off tax hike, or with the issuance of government 
consols and paying off the interests through future taxation. Ricardo argued that households 
would be indifferent to both propositions if they were forward looking. The Ricardian 
Equivalence Hypothesis (REH) was later revisited and formalised by Barro (1974). The 
public policy implications of this theory are clear. If the theory holds true, any reduction 7 
 
(increase) in taxes, and by extension, public savings, would be perfectly offset by an increase 
(reduction) in private savings, leaving national savings unchanged. This view, however, does 
not gain universal currency. Objections to the REH have been raised by Feldstein (1976) and 
Buchanan (1976), among many, who criticised Barro of ignoring other factors, for example 
growth, in his analysis. The empirical evidence suggests that while there is a partial offsetting 
of taxes and private savings, this offset does not quite hold one for one (see Corbo & 
Schmidt-Hebbel 1991; Doménech, Taguas & Varela 2000; Holmes 2006 for examples). 
The REH, however, is not the only theory that suggests substitutability between public and 
private savings. Specifically, the REH in the strictest form only considers changes in taxes 
entering into the household saving decision. It is possible that changes in the expenditure 
component of public savings can elicit a corresponding response in private savings through a 
separate channel that has nothing to do with the hypothesis. One such channel is the interest 
rate. In the spirit of intertemporal models allowing for substitution of consumption and 
savings between time periods, Blanchard (1985) and Auerbach & Kotlikoff (1987) found that 
increased government expenditure created incentives for households to save by pushing up 
interest rates. The relative magnitude of this response, though, depended on the time 
preferences for consumption of the household. Furthermore, Gouveia (1996) found that a $1 
increase in public health expenditure reduced private health expenditure by 70 cents. While 
not a full crowding out, it suggests that there exist high levels of substitutability between at 
least some components of public and private expenditure. In short, there are various channels 
hinting public savings crowding out private sector savings and this will be considered in the 
following empirical analysis.   
III.  Data 
For this empirical study, an unbalanced panel dataset of 55 countries with observations from 
year 1972-2004 was used. OPEC countries were excluded from the dataset, alluding to the 
fact that fluctuations in their savings are likely to be driven more by world demand and 
supply of crude oil than by factors like demography. In addition, countries with a population 
size of 1 million or less were excluded as their economies tend to compose mainly of a small 
group of, at times maybe as few as one or two, key industries. Demand or supply shocks to 
these industries can cause disproportionately large swings in their income and thus savings, 
introducing a large amount of noise into the dataset.  8 
 
The variables used for this study and their respective sources are listed in Table 2. 
[INSERT Table 2] 
Panel ADF tests were conducted to check all the variables for stationarity. The results of 
these tests are presented in the appendix. GDP per capita was found to contain a unit root, so 
the first difference of the series, i.e. income growth rate, was used in the model. Furthermore, 
given that saving was expressed as a percentage of GDP, the effect of income on the level of 
saving had already been controlled for. The full description of countries with their respective 
year coverage and summary statistics of variables used in the dataset can be found in the 
appendix. 
IV.  Methodology 
Model specification 
Savings behaviour, whether private or public, is likely to exhibits some degree of inertia. To 
allow for the “time to change” property, the following dynamic models were estimated: 
PUBi,t  = ρPUBi,t-1 + δ1GROWTHi,t-1 + δ2AGEDi,t + δ3LIFEi,t + θi +  vi,t      (1) 
PRIi,t   = ζPRIi,t-1 + π 1GROWTHi,t-1 + π2AGEDi,t + π3LIFEi,t +  π4PUBi,t + λi + ηi,t    (2) 
where PUB is public savings, PRI is private savings, GROWTH is real income growth per 
capita, AGED is age dependency ratio (defined as the ratio of population 65 and above to 
population 15-64), LIFE is life expectancy at birth, θ and λ are the country fixed effects, and 
v and η are the error terms. As will be discussed later, a two-step robust standard error 
correction for dynamic panel models was used, the distribution of the error terms is thus not 
crucial; correcting for standard errors in this manner allows for the weighing matrix to take 
into account both heteroskedasticity across individuals and autocorrelation within individuals. 
Lagged dependent variables were used in the model to capture the dynamic nature of both 
private and public savings. The life cycle variables, age dependency and life expectancy, 
were included to investigate the impact of ageing on savings. Standard growth models 
suggest that savings has the ability to drive income growth through capital accumulation. To 
mitigate reverse causality, the lagged of income growth is used. The theoretical argument of 
public savings crowding out private savings had been discussed earlier. On the contrary, there 
is no widely accepted theory of private savings driving public savings; private saving 9 
 
therefore does not enter (1). By the same logic, public saving can enter (2) 
contemporaneously as reverse causality is not an issue here. The public savings equation 
model is notably parsimonious. The literature hints that political and institutional variables 
are perhaps the most natural regressors for such a study. However, since institutional and 
political structures take many years or decades to evolve, the relative time invariant nature of 
such measures means that the country specific (i.e. fixed) effects should be sufficient to 
capture any such effect. 
Endogeniety and Instrumental Variables 
Nickell (1981) showed that estimating models presented by equation (1) and (2) as fixed 
effects panel data models introduces biasness and inconsistency of the estimator.
4 To 
circumvent this issue, instrumental variable (IV) techniques can be used. This technique starts 
off by taking the first differences to purge the fixed effects, following which appropriate 
instruments are chosen to account for endogeneity before finally estimating the coefficients. 
Taking the first difference of equation (1) and (2) yields 
∆PUBi,t = ρ∆PUBi,t-1 + δ1∆GROWTHi,t-1 + δ2∆AGEDi,t + δ3∆LIFEi,t + ∆vi,t     (3) 
∆PRIi,t   = ζ∆PRIi,t-1 + π 1∆GROWTHi,t-1 + π2∆AGEDi,t + π3∆LIFEi,t +  π4∆PUBi,t + ∆ηi,t   (4) 
The terms ∆PUBi,t-1 and ∆PRIi,t-1 are correlated with the transformed error terms ∆vi,t and ∆ηi,t 
respectively. Anderson & Hsiao (1982) suggested the second lag of the dependent variable 
(i.e. PUBt-2 and PRIt-2) as candidate instruments to break this correlation with the transformed 
error term. Arellano & Bond (1991) went a step further and proposed the second and deeper 
lag of the dependant variables as valid instruments since these observations would also not be 
correlated with the error term either. This procedure is commonly known within the literature 
as difference GMM. More recently, as an extension to difference GMM, Arellano & Bover 
(1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998) proposed additional moment conditions that could be 
exploited as valid instruments in a method known as system GMM. This firstly uses the first 
and deeper lag changes in the dependent variable to instrument for the lag of the dependent 
variable in the levels equation like (1) and (2)
5. Following which, using similar instruments as 
a difference GMM technique, the level and difference equations (similar to (3) and (4)) can 
be estimated as a system of two equations. In essence, difference GMM uses levels as 
instruments for differences while system GMM uses both differences and levels as 
                                                 
4 Greene  (2008) and Verbeek (2008) also provide a proof to this proposition 
5 For example, this would mean Pubt-1in equation (1) can be instrumented by ∆PUBt-1, ∆PUBt-2, ∆PUBt-3 etc.. 10 
 
instruments in a system of equations. Besides efficiency, there are practical benefits to using 
system GMM. If the dependent variable has a data generating process that is close to a 
random walk or exhibits a high level of persistency, differences make better instruments than 
levels since they generate better forecasts. 
Besides instrumenting the lagged dependent variable to remove the dynamic panel bias in the 
estimation process, instruments were also used to deal with endogeneity as in any regular IV 
or 2SLS framework. Age dependency ratios and life expectancy were taken to be exogenous 
in the models. It should be mentioned that while an exogenous and unmodelled shock can 
affect savings, age dependency and life expectancy, we chose to regard the latter two 
variables as exogenous in our model for two key reasons. Firstly, the most common 
exogenous shocks that can affect these variables simultaneously are events like pandemics, 
war, civil unrest etc. Since income growth was included in the model, most of these 
exogenous events had already been implicitly accounted for, thus reducing the chance that 
these exogenous events/shocks being captured by the error term. Secondly, the value of life 
expectancy at time t is constructed using mortality rates of different age groups in periods 
earlier
6. Therefore, by construction, life expectancy is at least a weakly exogenous variable. 
Similarly, age dependency is also at least a weakly exogenous variable because its value 
depends on the fertility and mortality rates from the past up to the current period. In short, 
within our estimation framework, it is unlikely that ∆AGEDi,t and ∆LIFEi,t are correlated with 
our transformed error terms, ∆vi,t and ∆ηi,t. At the same time, models estimated using 
instrumental variables by nature generate larger standard errors than ordinary least square 
estimates (Greene 2008), introducing needless imprecision. Therefore, it is paid in practice to 
‘restrict’ the number of endogenous variables in the model whenever it is theoretically 
appropriate to do so. 
Income growth was regarded as endogenous in our estimation due to its contemporaneous 
relationship between savings and income growth. A simple national account identity shows 
consumption, and by extension, savings, to be a function of income. Valid instruments for 
∆GROWTHi,t-1 in equation (3) and (4) will be the second and deeper lags of growth (i.e. 
GROWTHi,t-2, GROWTHi,t-3 etc). In a system GMM framework, valid instruments for 
                                                 
6 In theory the value of life expectancy at year t is constructed using mortality rates of different age groups at 
year t. However, due to either missing data or too few deaths in a particular year for robust estimates, mortality 
rates from earlier years are often used.   11 
 
Growthi,t-1 in equation (1) and (2) will correspondingly be the lag changes of income growth 
(i.e. ∆GROWTHi,t-1, ∆GROWTHi,t-2 etc). 
Public savings in equation (2) and (4) were taken as “predetermined” in the estimation and 
also instrumented. The first and deeper lags of public savings are thus valid instruments for 
∆PUBi,t in equation (4) and the change and all lag changes of public savings (i.e. ∆PUBi,t, 
∆PUBi,t-1 etc) are valid instruments for PUBi,t in equation (2). Implicitly, this implied that we 
regarded PUBi,t as being uncorrelated with ηi,t, proposing there exists no simultaneous 
determination of both the private and public saving levels once we controlled for income 
growth. Certainly, if public reacts instantly or even pre-emptively if they have forward 
looking expectations and information of a future change of public savings, this condition will 
no longer hold. Public savings will then be endogenous. We however, argue that using public 
savings as predetermined is valid. This mainly stems from the fact that private agents need 
time to learn about public saving rates before reacting and changing private savings 
accordingly. We take the view that private agents will rarely have such information of future 
changes in public savings since fiscal policy tends to be articulated through means like a 
budget announcement or an official government statement. Apart from that, it is unlikely that 
private agents can have any accurate idea of the true stance or state of fiscal policy. 
Furthermore, it must be noted that public expenditure and tax revenue are to a large extent 
determined by the fiscal policy stance of the government and therefore have a discretionary 
component. In any case, it was found ex post that even if we treated public savings as an 
endogenous variable, it did not change any of the conclusions found in this paper
7. 
While the theoretical reasons for the validity of the instruments have been justifed in the 
preceding discussion, an econometric issue  still arises if there exists correlation between the 
instrument set and the errors, rendering the instrument set invalid. Using equation (3) as an 
example, if ∆vi,t is correlated with ∆vi,t-2, this means PUBi,t-2 is invalid as an instrument since 
PUBi,t-2 is correlated with ∆vi,t-2 through vi,t-2. In this case, only the third and deeper lags of 
public savings are valid instruments assuming ∆vi,t is not correlated with ∆vi,t-3. This 
underlines the simple idea behind Arellano & Bond’s (1991) AR test. An AR(2) test will for 
example test whether ∆vi,t is correlated with ∆vi,t-2. Deeper order AR tests can also be 
conducted. 
                                                 
7 The point estimates only diverged at the 5
th decimal place onwards and the standard errors only started 
differing at the 4
th decimal place onwards. 12 
 
Like any standard IV estimation, using more instruments than endogenous variables results in 
an overidentified system. Tests can be conducted to see if the additional moment conditions 
are valid to be exploited as instruments. Commonly used tests are the Hansen and Sargan 
tests, also known as the J and C tests respectively. Roodman (2006), however, cautions that 
these tests should not be relied on too faithfully. It is known that the Sargan test is not 
consistent, and the Hansen tests can be weakened by too many instruments to the point that 
even extremely reassuring evidence of the validity of the instruments can be rendered 
meaningless. This is especially an issue for system GMM as the instrument set has the 
potential to blow up rapidly. In addition, while excess instruments have the potential of 
allowing for greater precision, they are also known to bias estimators. While the literature is 
not helpful in providing a guide as to how many instruments is considered “too many”, as a 
general thumb of rule, the number of instruments used should not exceed the number of 
observations (Roodman 2006). Even so, Windmeijer (2005) had shown that this limit can still 
be overly generous. 
The practical benefits of a larger instrument set generating greater precision cannot be 
ignored for our empirical study. Mindful of the pitfalls of large instrument sets biasing our 
estimators, some practical strategies were undertaken to ensure this would not be the case. 
Firstly, the instrument set can be reduced when doing robustness checks since this will 
presumably increase the power of the Hansen Test. Our J test results revealed the validity of 
our instruments, with insufficient evidence to suggest the contrary. This was still the case 
even when the instrument set was reduced. Secondly, the AR(2) test did not reject the null of 
no autocorrelation at conventional significance levels for all the regressions in this paper, so 
providing no evidence to invalidate our instrument choices. 
To recap, in the levels equation (i.e equation (1) and (2)), the first and deeper lag changes 
were used as instruments for the lagged dependent variable and lag income growth. All lag 
changes of public savings were used as instruments. For the difference equations (i.e. 
equation (3) and (4)), the second and deeper lags of the lagged dependent variable and 
income growth were used as instruments for the first lagged change income growth and the 
dependent variable. The first and deeper lags of public savings were used as instruments for 
∆PUBi,t.   
Finally, a two-step standard error correction method was used to allow for heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation. However, this method is known to cause a downward bias in the 13 
 
standard errors; they are thereby further adjusted using Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard 
errors. 
V.  Results and Discussion 
Base Model Results 
Equations (1) and (2) were estimated using system GMM. The results are presented in Table 
3. The results confirm that private saving rate exhibits a high level of inertia, with the 
coefficient on its lag being equal to 0.74 and highly significant. The presence of this inertia 
suggests that changes in private savings would happen over a considerable period of time, 
hinting at a static model’s inability to adequately capture the full impact of crowding out of 
private savings over the long-run, especially if the time dimension of the dataset is short. 
Income growth has a positive sign but is not significant. 
[INSERT Table 3] 
Age dependency is found to have a negative impact on private savings. In this respect, our 
findings support the LCH. We found that a one percentage point increase in the age 
dependency ratio decreases private savings as a percentage of GDP by 0.124 and 0.475 
percentage points in the short and long-run respectively. Unfortunately, the vast majority of 
the literature cannot be directly compared to these results. Firstly, many previous studies used 
static models while ours was a dynamic model. Secondly, as ageing was our focus, we used 
age dependency. This meant that we could not compare with papers that used total 
dependency.
8 Thirdly, the sample coverage might be different. Notwithstanding these, our 
long-run coefficient is quite similar to those obtained by Serres & Pelgrin (2003), who found 
the long-run coefficient to be in the range of -0.5 to -0.6 in a variety of specifications. 
Increases in life expectancy had a positive impact on private savings, confirming the 
theoretical validity of the LCH. For a 1 year increase in life expectancy, we expect private 
savings as a percentage of GDP to increase by 0.108 and 0.413 percentage points in the short 
and long-run respectively. Rising life expectancy, on the other hand, does not cause any 
significant decrease in public savings. Recall that there is a literature suggesting that most of 
the health expenditure is used for the last few years of life, so a longer lifespan does not 
necessary imply higher (public) health expenditure as suggested by the likes of Cutler & 
                                                 
8 In later section we will report our results using youth and total dependency ratios respectively. 14 
 
Sheiner (1998). In addition, countries may actually be reforming their social security system 
to increase the age where individuals can draw benefits from the system. Our results are also 
similar to those obtained by Bloom, Canning & Graham (2003). Once again though, we have 
to be careful with comparing the results between dynamic and static models. Nevertheless, 
these similarities provide some degree of reassurance of our results. 
The short and long-run coefficients of public savings in the private savings equation are 
statistically significantly and negative. The point estimate of the long-run coefficient is equal 
to -0.87, no too far off from -1, which suggests a full crowding out effect of public savings on 
private savings. The 90% confidence interval for the long-run coefficient ranges from -1.62 
to -0.13. Although the interval encompasses -1, it is nevertheless quite wide. The large 
confidence interval is due to the fact that it takes a combination of the standard errors of the 
short-run coefficients for both the lagged private savings and public savings to compute that 
that of the long-run coefficient on public savings. Therefore, whilst not entirely dismissing 
the possibility of a full crowding out, we acknowledge that the evidence is not overwhelming 
either. Nevertheless, the lower and upper bounds of the interval are both negative; this result 
being consistent with there being at least some level of crowding out. The uncovering of the 
possibility of full long-run crowding out effect might be attributed to the use of a dynamic 
model. 
Turning to the results of the public saving equation in Table 3, the inertia of public savings is 
even stronger than that of private savings, with the coefficient on its lag being equal to 0.83 
and is highly significant. This is probably because many public revenue and expenditure 
items are structural and cannot be changed quickly. Like that in the private saving regression, 
income growth is of the positive sign but not significant. 
Age dependency had also been found to reduce public savings. This is broadly consistent 
with the results obtained by Kim & Lee (2008), though they used total dependency and 
different model specifications. Our estimates indicated that for a one percentage point 
increase in age dependency, public savings as a percentage of GDP falls by 0.035 and 0.209 
percentage points in the short and long-run respectively. It is therefore clear that age 
dependency reduces both private and public savings.  
Life expectancy also has a positive effect on public savings like that on private savings. 
However, compared to private savings results, the magnitude of the coefficient is far smaller 15 
 
and is not significant at all. This is hardly a surprise as private savings are probably more 
sensitive towards life-cycle determinants than public savings. 
For completeness of the analysis, the overall impact of ageing on national savings was also 
examined with the following regression: 
NATi,t  = αi + ρNATi,t-1 + β1GROWTHi,t-1 + β2AGEDi,t + β3LIFEi,t + vi,t      (5) 
where NAT is national savings. The equation is estimated in similar fashion to those of 
private and public savings equations using system GMM. Lagged income growth was 
regarded as endogenous, and age dependency and life expectancy treated as exogenous 
variables
9. The results of this regression are also presented in Table 3. 
The short-run coefficients for life expectancy and age dependency were both significant. In 
the long-run, private savings as a percentage of GDP will decrease by 0.52 percentage points 
in response to a one percentage point increase in age dependency and increase by 0.43 
percentage points in response to a one year increase in life expectancy respectively. Owing 
perhaps to the imprecision of combining standard errors, the long-run coefficients are 
marginally insignificant at the 10% level of significance. Notwithstanding, the point 
estimates of the long-run coefficient did not deviate very much from those obtained in the 
private savings regression
10. This is consistent with the possibility of full crowding out effect 
reported earlier, suggesting that changes in national savings may be almost entirely driven by 
changes in private savings; rendering changes in public saving rates irrelevant due to an 
endogenous response by the private sector. This can also be due to the size of public savings 
making up a very small component of national savings, and therefore, it is relative 
unimportance in the determination of national savings. Furthermore, the signs are correct, 
with at least the short-run coefficients being statistically significant, indicating that increases 
in both age dependency and life expectancy will, ceteris paribus, decrease and increase 
national savings respectively.  
Developed versus Developing Countries 
                                                 
9 In similar fashion, equation (5) was transformed with a first difference to get a difference equation. Thereafter, 
the first and deeper lagged change of income growth and national savings were used as instruments for lagged 
national savings and lagged income growth respectively in the levels equation presented in equation (5). In the 
difference equation, the second and deeper lag of national savings and income growth were used as instruments 
for ∆Nati,t-1 and ∆Growthi,t-1 respectively. 
10 -0.52 compared to -0.48 for age dependency and 0.43 compared to 0.41 for life expectancy. 16 
 
A natural question that arises from our results is whether our estimates are robust to different 
types of countries, considering that there is a mix of 31 developed and 24 developing 
countries in our dataset
11. To test for this, we re-ran regressions (1) and (2), breaking the 
sample into developed and developing countries. A sample of OECD member nations was 
also taken. The OECD sample was taken to allow for countries that have similar institutional 
features. The results of these regressions are reported in Table 4 and Table 5. In terms of the 
long-run coefficient estimates, the results for the OECD and the developed countries sample 
are very similar for private savings. While the point estimates for public savings regression 
do differ in both samples, the same variables in both specifications are statistically 
significant. This is probably because 25 out of the 31 developed economies are OECD 
members. 
[INSERT Table 4 and Table 5] 
There is evidence that age dependency is a drag on public savings only in the developed and 
OECD economies, but not in developing economies. This could be due to the fact that 
developing countries often house less democratic institutions such that their governments are 
less pressed to respond to demographic changes. On the other hand, our findings for private 
savings are very robust to various subsamples. There was evidence across all three groups 
that age dependency and life expectancy reduces and increases private savings respectively. 
In fact, the long-run coefficients across all three samples are very similar for both drivers of 
ageing. This result also provides assurance that findings of high age dependency reducing 
private savings in the full sample are not solely being driven by developed countries alone. 
Another interesting result is that there was less than a full crowding out of private savings in 
the subsample of developed economies
12. The developing economies sample had insufficient 
evidence against the hypothesis of a full offsetting effect. However, once again, this is mostly 
driven by the large standard errors blowing up the width of the confidence interval. It is 
worthwhile to note that the long-run coefficient of -2.1 is very large
13. It is also worth noting 
that while increases in public savings will have a negative impact on private savings, only the 
developing subsample has evidence of a potential full crowding out effect. 
                                                 
11 This is by the World Bank’s definition of developed and developing countries. 
12 The upper bound for the 90% confidence interval for the long-run coefficient of public savings is even 
marginally positive, though at 10% level of significance, the point estimate is different from zero. 
13 This confidence interval is also very large, ranging from crowding out 3 times over to only a crowding out of 
about 30%. A contributing factor to this imprecision is the relatively small sample size of 302 observations for 
developing countries. 17 
 
Finally, while not statistically significant in the findings presented in Table 3, income growth 
is a statistically significant driver of both private and public sector savings for developing 
countries. Growth theory tends to predict high savings driving higher growth. This result 
might hint at the possibility that developing countries can enter a virtuous cycle: higher 
savings driving higher growth, which in turns drives higher savings and even higher growth. 
[INSERT Table 6] 
Real Interest Rate 
The real interest rate
14 was also considered as a determinant for private savings. There are 
two key reasons why this is incorporated in the analysis. Firstly, intertemporal models of 
consumption regard movement in the interest rate as a change in the relative price of 
consumption between time periods. Utility maximising agents respond to this relative change 
in prices by moving consumption, and thus savings, between periods. Theory thus demands 
that real interest rate be considered in the empirical model. However, due to limitations on 
the data coverage
15, this was not done in the original empirical analysis. Nonetheless, 
considering real interest rate as a determinant of private savings on a reduced sample will 
provide some comparisons with the base model. Secondly, in Barro’s (1974) formalisation of 
the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis, it was shown that real interest rates remained 
unchanged and it was the changes in taxes that was driving agents to change their saving rates 
in response. Therefore, if the change in the real interest rate was a channel where changes in 
public savings affect public savings, we would expect to see both the real interest rate being 
statistically significant and the coefficient of public savings shrinking or perhaps even 
becoming statistically insignificant. The results of this regression can be found in Table 6. 
The sample covers 26 developed countries and 7 developing countries. 
The long-run coefficient of age dependency and life expectancy are very similar to the base 
model, giving confidence to the robustness of the results
16. Real interest rate is positively 
significant. The long run coefficient of public savings has reduced, though still statistically 
significant. This provides some support to the interest rate channel argument of the crowding 
                                                 
14 We have constructed the real interest rate from taking the difference between nominal interest rates and 
inflation. The data sources for these variables are the IMF’s International Finance Statistics series, Government 
Bond Yields and WDI respectively. 
15 The data coverage shrinks to 680 observation when real interest rate is considered, losing slightly under half 
of the data set. 
16 Inflation was also considered. Inflation was marginally negatively significant and the inclusion of inflation 
did not change the magnitude of all the other coefficients very much. 18 
 
out effects. Nonetheless, since the coefficient of public savings is still negatively significant, 
this suggests that Barro’s view of Ricardian Equivalence occurring though the tax channel 
cannot be dismissed. 
Wealth 
Consideration for wealth affecting the savings function was also considered in the empirical 
analysis. Permanent income hypothesis predicts that an increase in wealth, if translated into a 
permanent increase in income, will increase consumption, and so decreasing private savings. 
Therefore, we should theoretically expect a negative relationship between private savings and 
wealth. 
In this paper, we have used the measurement of broad money (M2) as a percentage of GDP as 
a proxy for wealth. Our logic stems from the fact that higher wealth would increase the 
motivation for more financial instruments to smooth consumption. The measure of broad 
money thus acts as a proxy for the deepening in the financial system. The results are also 
presented in Table 6. 
Two broad observations can be seen when our proxy of wealth was used, giving confidence 
to our earlier findings. First, the statistically significant negative sign gives the “correct” sign, 
providing some evidence that our measurement of wealth has a negative association with 
private savings. However, the size of the coefficient, -0.0002, is very small and can be 
considered economically insignificant. Second, the statistical significance of the demographic 
variables in the short run, while reduced, provides confidence of our previous results. The 
main reason driving the statistical insignificance of the long run coefficients for the 
demographic variables is probably mainly because the sample is heavily dominated by 
developing countries owing to data constraints. The results thus mirror the results derived for 
the sample of developing countries in Table 5. This measurement was thus not considered in 
the main empirical exercise owning to the fact that once again, too many observations 
dropped out of the sample due to data constraints and the sample was dominated by 
developing countries. 
To this end, estimation of such a savings-wealth function presents a number of interesting 
challenges. Firstly, using permanent income hypothesis as a theoretical base, changes in 
wealth has to be perceived to be permanent for there to be any discernable changes in 
consumption and saving levels. Therefore, though not done in this paper, distinguishing of 19 
 
whether the change in wealth is permanent or transitory is by itself, an important theoretical 
consideration. It can also not be ruled out the small and economically insignificant magnitude 
of wealth might be due to not making the distinction between permanent and transitory 
changes. Secondly, measurement of wealth is by itself tricky. This is an especially thorny 
issue when macro aggregated data is used. Therefore, there are issues whether the 
measurement of wealth is accurately measured. Empirical analysis that can sufficiently 
address the two above mention issues can be considered for future research. 
Omission Bias 
A practical question that confronts researchers in this field is whether the study of the 
demographic effect on savings can be done without jointly considering both life expectancy 
and age dependency. The correlation coefficient of both variables in our dataset was -0.68, a 
figure considered moderately high. Thus, jointly considering both in the same regression 
potentially introduces a high level of collinearity. On the other hand, due to the theoretical 
underpinnings of age dependency and life expectancy exerting different influences in private 
savings, omitting either variable could bias the estimation to the extent that it alters the sign 
of the other variable. The papers listed in Table 1, while widely cited, all failed to take into 
account longevity in their models. In Table 7, we show the extent of the bias in omitting life 
expectancy and age dependency respectively from our base model for both private and public 
savings estimated in Table 3. Clearly, omitted life expectancy caused the coefficient on age 
dependency to be biased upwards from -0.124 to 0.062. The bias in our sample was 
particularly strong to the point that the coefficient on age dependency was no longer 
statistically significant and has the wrong sign. Likewise, omitting age dependency caused 
the coefficient on life expectancy to be biased downwards from 0.108 to 0.066. Though the 
coefficient remained statistically significant and correctly signed, it was now much smaller in 
magnitude. For public savings, if we omitted life expectancy, the coefficient of age 
dependency changed from -0.035 to -0.018. While the coefficient was still statistically 
significant, there is an upward bias that understates the magnitude of the negative impact age 
dependency had on public savings. However, if we dropped age dependency, life expectancy 
clearly becomes negative and significant with its coefficient changing from 0.005 to -0.003. 
Therefore, this omission can cause wrong conclusions to be made since it is age 
dependency—not longevity—that is driving this fall in public savings. 20 
 
The results derived from this exercise suggest that researchers have to be careful to jointly 
consider both age dependency and life expectancy when ascertaining the full and 
disaggregated impact of ageing. 
[INSERT Table 7] 
Youth and Total Dependency 
To further test the robustness of our findings, we also attempted to allow youth dependency 
or total dependency to enter the model instead of age dependency. These are presented in 
Table 8. 
[INSERT Table 8] 
Youth dependency was never statistically significant for both private and public savings and 
even has the ‘wrong’ sign. Therefore, it was not surprising that when total dependency was 
used, it was no longer significant for public savings. For private savings, total dependency 
was still significant, but since youth dependency did not affect private savings, while age 
dependency did, this would indicate that this result is being driven solely by age dependency. 
Life expectancy was still significant in both private savings specification; therefore once 
again reaffirm the importance of jointly considering longevity. Finally, public savings was 
still a significant driver of private savings for both specifications, and the 90% confidence 
interval for the long-run coefficient still contained -1 in both cases. 
Alternative Instruments 
Finally, as presented in the appendix, the instrument set was reduced to see whether it altered 
the results derived in the base model. Two ways were used in the reduction of the instrument 
set. One method available was to “collapse” the instrument set matrix to reduce the 
instrument count
17. Since, our models were estimated using the first and deeper valid lags as 
instruments, another method for reducing the instrument set was to use only the first valid lag 
as an instrument
18. Reducing the instrument set through both methods changed neither the 
coefficient estimates very much nor the conclusions for private savings. For public savings, 
                                                 
17 For technical details on the construction of the instrument matrix are described in graduate econometric 
textbooks like Greene (2008) and Verbeek (2008). Though “collapsing” is described as non-standard by 
Roodman (2006), he show how this instrument matrix can be “collapsed” and this is the procedure undertaken 
in this paper. Instruments set in an “uncollapsed” form generates instruments that are quadratic in T. 
“Collapsing” shrinks the instrument matrix and thus reduces the instruments generated. 
18 For example, instead of using the second and deeper lag of public savings to instrument for ∆PUBi,t-1 in 
equation (3), we will use only the second lag and no more. 21 
 
though the coefficients estimates for age dependency started to deviate quite substantially 
from those derived earlier, the conclusions were still the same as in that the signs were 
unchanged and the same sets of coefficients were statistically significant. As described 
earlier, one could find issues with the validity of our J statistics in the Hansen test because as 
the instrument set is so large that it may make inferences from those J statistics useless. 
Reduction of the instrument set increases the power of the Hansen Test. It was also found that 
after doing so the instrument set still suggested there was insufficient evidence that the 
reduced set of moment conditions were invalid. Therefore, this can be taken to suggest the 
validity and the robustness of the key findings and results of the paper. 
Policy Implications 
The results from the various robustness tests, including using split samples, indicate that by 
and large the findings in Table 3 are very robust. This relieves us from sensitivity issues 
when drawing economic and policy implications from the results. 
First of all, it is clear from our findings that both age dependency and life expectancy exert 
opposite effects on private savings, and in turn national savings. This implies that there is 
uncertainty in the overall impact of ageing on private savings, especially if an ageing society 
experiences both increases in age dependency and life expectancy. 
The European Commission (2002 see section I.4) suggested increasing public savings before 
the onset of ageing to maintain fiscal sustainability. Floden (2003) also echoed the same 
view, asking for higher taxes and public expenditure cuts to reduce the welfare impact of 
debts. Our findings on crowding out cast doubts whether expenditure cuts or increased 
taxation by the public sector as a preparation for population ageing might only serve the 
purposes of improving public budget position, but irrelevant in terms of changing the national 
savings rates. If the focus of public policy is to increase national savings, perhaps effort 
should instead be targeted at influencing the level of private savings
19. 
The finding that longevity can increase private and thus national savings potentially creates a 
development trap. Countries endowed with an unfavourable environment for health would 
have low savings, low growth and thus low income, which would in turn become a barrier to 
improve their life expectancy (Tang, Petrie & Rao 2009), ending up trapped in a vicious 
                                                 
19 Policies that could influence private savings include, for instance, taxes on investment income or capital gain. 22 
 
cycle. A corollary of this is that health aid could potentially play an important role in 
breaking the vicious cycle (Mishra & Newhouse 2009). 
The positive relationship between longevity and (private and national) savings also present 
some interesting implications for countries with large longevity gaps. Within our dataset, the 
“best performing” country in terms of life expectancy was Japan at about 82 years in 2004. 
Emerging economies like India and Brazil, with life expectancy being around 70 years, have 
a longevity gap of over 10 years compared to Japan. Based on our estimates, closing this gap 
could increase Brazil’s private and national savings by over 4 percentage points of GDP in 
the long-run, not an insignificant figure. Even advanced economies like the United Kingdom 
Belgium, and Austria could raise private savings by about 1.2 percentage points of GDP 
through closing their 3-year longevity gaps with Japan. The possibility exists that even best 
performing nations can still increase longevity further. Conservative projections made by Lee 
& Carter (1992) and Tuljapurkar, Li & Boe (2000) predict life expectancy to increase to 90 
years by 2100. Taking this estimate, private savings would increase by over 3 percentage 
points for Japan. However, there are also opposite predictions that life expectancy in this 
generation may be regressing, mainly due to health issues associated with obesity and 
lifestyle choices (Olshansky et al. 2005). If the second scenario turns out to the case, this 
would give an even more pessimistic outlook compared to previous studies that only looked 
at age dependency, as the accompanying decrease in life expectancy creates a twin drag on 
national and private savings. 
The preceding discussion about increases in life expectancy not depressing savings and 
growth outcomes of course implicitly assumed age dependency remaining constant. With 
higher age dependency acting as a drag on private and, in turn, national savings, policy 
influencing fertility rates will have to be implemented to allow a greater, or at least a 
constant, stream of people entering the 15-64 age bracket than those entering the 65+ age 
group. But is this possible? Within the literature, some have regarded falling fertility rates as 
an endogenous response towards higher life expectancy (Becker & Barro 1988). To allow 
rising longevity to take place without allowing for increases in age dependency will mean 
either more aggressive immigration policy targeted at those in the working age bracket, or 
policy to give incentives having children, or a mix of both. However, for the world as a 
whole, immigration policy that boosts the proportion of the working population in the 
destination country will inevitably lowers that in the source countries. 23 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
Demographic change has the potential to alter macroeconomic outcomes. However, besides 
due consideration to the age structure, changes in longevity levels, which tends to accompany 
demographic change, can also exert their influence on savings behaviour at both private and 
public levels. This paper has found that age dependency exerts a drag on private and, in turn, 
national savings. Rising life expectancy can result in an increase in private savings. This is in 
contrast to the conventional view that ageing will only act as a drag on savings. The overall 
impact ageing has on savings is likely to depend on the relative pace of increases in longevity 
compared to the rise in age dependency.  
The findings in this paper also indicate that in future demographic studies, age dependency 
should perhaps be jointly considered with life expectancy to avoid the potential of biased 
estimator. For many developed economies, despite the notion of a ceiling on life expectancy, 
there is still room to increase life expectancy by as much as 5 years in the United States for 
instance. Our calculations show that this can increase savings by a reasonably substantial 
magnitude in the long-run. This paper also found that there exists some degree of crowding 
out of private savings, with anecdotal evidence to suggest the possibility of a full crowding 
out. This hints that changes in public saving rates can be potentially irrelevant in terms of 
changing the national saving rate. In terms of policy implications, this suggests that countries 
that need to prop up national savings should design policy to simulate saving by the private 
sector. 
Undoubtedly, solutions to deal with ageing populations will increasingly feature in the policy 
debate in the not so distant future. This paper looks at one channel where ageing can 
potentially exert a long term macroeconomic impact—savings. Ageing is primarily caused by 
higher age dependency and rising longevity. To this end, this paper finds that the impact 
ageing has on savings is at best ambiguous. Crucial consideration thus has to be paid to 
disentangle which of the two factors dominate in the determination of savings. 
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Table 1 Summary of Selected Studies on the Demographic Effect on Private Savings 
Study  Empirical focus  Data coverage  Empirical findings 
Edwards (1996)  Determinants of public 
and private savings 
36 countries, 
1970-1992 
Total Dependency(-) 
Bailliu & Reisen (1998)  Does increase in 
funded pension wealth 
increase aggregate 
savings? 
10 countries, 
1982-1993 
Total Dependency (Nil) 
Masson, Bayoumi & Samiei 
(1998) 
International 
determinants of private 
savings 
61 countries, 
1971-1993 
Total Dependency (-) 
Haque, Pesaran & Sharma 
(1999) 
Are studies of savings 
behaviour robust to 
considerations of 
dynamics and 
heterogeneity? 
61 countries, 
1971-1993, 
Same dataset as 
Masson, Bayoumi 
& Samiei (1998) 
Total Dependency (Nil) 
Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel & 
Serven (2000) 
Determinants of 
private savings 
150 countries, 
1965-1994 
Youth Dependency (-) 
Age dependency (-) 
Serres & Pelgrin (2003)  Determinants of the 
OECD private savings 
15 OECD 
countries, 1970-
2000 
Age dependency (-) 
(-) Variable was statistically negatively significant. (Nil) Variable was not statistically significant 
 
Table 2 Variables and Sources 
VARIABLE SOURCE 
GDP Per Capita PPP, Base Year 2000  Penn World Tables 6.2 
Public Savings (as a % of GDP)  IMF  World  Economic  Outlook,  IMF  Government 
Financial Statistics 
Private Savings (as a % of GDP)  Constructed as the difference between National Savings in 
World Development Indicators (WDI) and Public Savings 
Age dependency Ratio (ratio of 
population 65 and above to population 
15-64 
WDI 
Life Expectancy at Birth  WDI 29 
 
Table 3 Estimation Results Using System GMM 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Private savings  Public savings  National savings 
   
Long-run 
coefficient  
Long-run 
coefficient  
Long-run 
coefficient 
Lagged private 
savings 
0.738*** 
(0.0744)      
 
Lagged public 
savings    
0.832*** 
(0.0552)    
 
Lagged national 
savings      
 
0.846*** 
(0.0679) 
 
Lagged income 
growth 
0.042 
(0.0331) 
0.160 
(0.132) 
0.014 
(0.0301) 
0.082 
(0.197) 
0.024 
(0.0350) 
0.158 
(0.236) 
Public savings 
-0.229*** 
(0.0615) 
-0.874** 
(0.451)     
 
 
Age dependency 
-0.124*** 
(0.0373) 
-0.475** 
(0.253) 
-0.035** 
(0.0176) 
-0.209 
(0.158) 
-0.080** 
(0.0366) 
-0.518 
(0.438) 
Life expectancy 
0.108*** 
(0.0301) 
0.413** 
(0.230) 
0.005 
(0.0037) 
0.028 
(0.025) 
0.066** 
(0.0285) 
0.426 
(0.369) 
90% confidence 
interval for long-
run coefficient for 
public savings  [-1.617, -0.131]     
J statistic H0: 
Surplus moment 
conditions are valid  46.46 54.63 51.10 
AR(2) test p value 
H0: No 2
nd order 
autocorrelation  0.336 0.127 0.184 
No. of observations  1046 1046 1046 
No. of instruments  1030 935  935 
 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
***Significant at 1% level of significance. **Significant at 5% level of significance. *Significant at 10% level 
of significance. 30 
 
Table 4 Public Savings by Group 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Developed countries  Developing countries  OECD 
   
Long-run 
coefficient     
Long-run 
coefficient 
Lagged public 
savings 
0.870*** 
(0.0836)   
0.614*** 
(0.1507)   
0.795*** 
(0.1159)   
Lagged income 
growth 
-0.018 
(0.0463) 
-0.142 
(0.341) 
0.063* 
(0.0339) 
0.162* 
(0.120) 
0.022 
(0.0483) 
0.109 
(0.271) 
Age dependency 
-0.040* 
(0.0241) 
-0.305 
(0.352) 
-0.012 
(0.0329) 
-0.031 
(0.094) 
-0.018* 
(0.0134) 
-0.086* 
(0.087) 
Life expectancy 
0.008 
(0.0060) 
0.064 
(0.068) 
0.003 
(0.0073) 
0.009 
(0.021) 
-0.003 
(0.0074) 
-0.016 
(0.043) 
J statistic H0: 
Surplus moment 
conditions are valid  29.93 19.12 23.74 
AR(2) test p value 
H0: No 2
nd order 
autocorrelation  0.128 0.310 0.346 
No. of observations  744 302 667 
No. of instruments  715 302 643 
 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
***Significant at 1% level of significance. **Significant at 5% level of significance. *Significant at 10% level 
of significance. 31 
 
Table 5 Private Savings by Group 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Developed countries  Developing countries  OECD 
   
Long-run 
coefficient   
Long-run 
coefficient   
Long-run 
coefficient 
Lagged private savings 
0.487*** 
(0.1709)   
0.651*** 
(0.2109)   
0.472*** 
(0.1467)   
Lagged income growth 
-0.011 
(0.0386) 
-0.021 
(0.080) 
0.151*** 
(0.0509) 
0.431* 
(0.222) 
0.072 
(0.0550) 
0.136 
(0.117) 
Public savings 
-0.156** 
(0.0850) 
-0.305* 
(0.235) 
-0.733** 
(0.1619) 
-2.100** 
(1.077) 
-0.254** 
(0.1044) 
-0.481** 
(0.290) 
Age dependency 
-0.325*** 
(0.1243) 
-0.634* 
(0.446) 
-0.227** 
(0.1186) 
-0.651 
(0.725) 
-
0.215*** 
(0.0711) 
-0.408** 
(0.238) 
Life expectancy 
0.256*** 
(0.0899) 
0.499* 
(0.341) 
0.136** 
(0.0789) 
0.391 
(0.461) 
0.221*** 
(0.0634) 
0.419** 
(0.235) 
Real Interest Rate         
90% confidence interval for 
long-run coefficient for public 
savings  [-0.693, 0.083]  [-3.876, -0.323]  [-0.958, -0.003] 
J statistic H0: Surplus 
moment conditions are valid  19.29 12.55  15.68 
AR(2) test p value H0: No 2
nd 
order autocorrelation  0.426 0.499  0.390 
No. of observations  744 302  667 
No. of instruments  734 302  660 
 
Standard errors in parenthesis.  
***Significant at 1% level of significance. **Significant at 5% level of significance. *Significant at 10% 
level of significance. 32 
 
Table 6 Private Savings Specifications Using Real Interest Rate and Wealth Measure 
 (1)  (2) 
 
26 Developed and 7 developing 
countries 
19 Developed and 24 
developing countries 
   
Long-run 
coefficient   
Long-run 
coefficient 
Lagged private savings 
0.686*** 
(0.1098) 
  0.866*** 
(0.0795) 
 
Lagged income growth 
0.066 
(0.0849) 
0.209 
(0.291) 
0.070 
(0.0535) 
0.518 
(0.359) 
Public savings 
-0.155** 
(0.0845) 
-0.494 
(0.321) 
-0.213** 
(0.0901) 
-1.589 
(1.402) 
Age dependency 
-0.157*** 
(0.0465) 
-0.501* 
(0.305) 
-0.073* 
(0.0489) 
-0.541 
(0.602) 
Life expectancy 
0.137*** 
(0.0478) 
0.437* 
(0.303) 
0.054* 
(0.0340) 
0.403 
(0.488) 
Real Interest Rate 
0.010*** 
(0.0027) 
0.033* 
(0.041)    
M2 percentage of GDP    
-0.000** 
(0.0001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
90% confidence interval for long-
run coefficient for public savings  [-1.023,0.035] [-3.897,0.719] 
J statistic H0: Surplus moment 
conditions are valid  26.67 39.84 
AR(2) test p value H0: No 2
nd order 
autocorrelation  0.390 0.104 
No. of observations  680 686 
No. of instruments  678 686 
 
Standard errors in parenthesis.  
***Significant at 1% level of significance. **Significant at 5% level of significance. *Significant at 10% 
level of significance. 
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Table 7 Estimation Results with Omission of Age dependency or Life Expectancy 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
  Private savings  Private savings  Public savings  Public savings 
   
Long-run 
coefficient   
Long-run 
coefficient   
Long-run 
coefficient   
Long-run 
coefficient 
Lagged private savings 
0.920*** 
(0.0424) 
  0.772*** 
(0.0502)       
 
Lagged public savings   
 
  
0.843*** 
(0.0429)  
0.846*** 
(0.0425)  
Lagged income growth 
0.089** 
(0.0397) 
1.112 
(0.825) 
0.062* 
(0.0323) 
0.273* 
(0.150) 
0.019 
(0.0194) 
0.121 
(0.125) 
0.010 
(0.0171) 
0.066 
(0.115) 
Public savings 
-0.141** 
(0.0605) 
-1.764 
(1.391) 
-0.225*** 
(0.0610) 
-0.987*** 
(0.443)        
Age dependency 
0.062 
(0.0491) 
0.775 
(1.012)    
-0.018** 
(0.0075) 
-0.114 
(0.149)    
Life expectancy   
  0.066*** 
(0.0155) 
0.291*** 
(0.131)    
-0.003* 
(0.0017) 
-0.021* 
(0.015) 
90% confidence interval for long-run 
coefficient for public savings  [-4.054, 0.525]  [-1.716, -0.259]     
J statistic H0: Surplus moment conditions are 
valid  49.68 44.35 54.01  53.58 
AR(2) test p value H0: No 2
nd order 
autocorrelation  0.359 0.337 0.129  0.126 
No. of observations  1046 1046 1046  1046 
No. of instruments  1029 1029  934 934 
 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
***Significant at 1% level of significance. **Significant at 5% level of significance. *Significant at 10% level of significance. 
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Table 8 Estimation Allowing for Alternative Measures of Economic Dependency 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Private savings  Public savings  Private savings  Public savings 
   
Long-run 
coefficient   
Long-run 
coefficient   
Long-run 
coefficient   
Long-run 
coefficient 
Lagged private savings 
0.815*** 
(0.0543)      
0.808*** 
(0.0490)      
Lagged public savings    
0.838*** 
(0.0554)    
  0.847*** 
(0.0451)   
Lagged income growth 
0.055 
(0.0396) 
0.299 
(0.216) 
0.016 
(0.0345) 
0.101 
(0.238) 
0.055 
(0.0398) 
0.285 
(0.207) 
0.013 
(0.0234) 
0.088 
(0.167) 
Public savings 
-0.190** 
(0.0805) 
-1.025* 
(0.651)    
-0.182*** 
(0.0631) 
-0.945** 
(0.485)    
Youth dependency 
0.001 
(0.0059) 
0.006 
(0.032) 
0.002 
(0.0029) 
0.012 
(0.019)  
 
  
Total dependency        
-0.010* 
(0.0073) 
-0.054* 
(0.042) 
0.000 
(0.0040) 
-0.003 
(0.026) 
Life expectancy 
0.053*** 
(0.0171) 
0.288** 
(0.173) 
-0.005 
(0.0036) 
-0.029 
(0.031) 
0.063*** 
(0.0172) 
0.329** 
(0.168) 
-0.003 
(0.0038) 
-0.019 
(0.028) 
90% confidence interval for long-run 
coefficient for public savings  [-2.096, 0.047]    [-1.743, -0.146]   
J statistic H0: Surplus moment conditions 
are valid  46.88 52.57  43.18  53.59 
AR(2) test p value H0: No 2
nd order 
autocorrelation  0.346 0.128  0.348  0.128 
No. of observations  1046 1046  1046  1046 
No. of instruments  1030 935  1030  935 
 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 35 
 
***Significant at 1% level of significance. **Significant at 5% level of significance. *Significant at 10% level of significance. 36 
 
APPENDIX 
Table A1 Data Coverage 
Country  Year coverage  Number of time periods 
Australia 1972-2004  33 
Austria 1972-2004  33 
Azerbaijan 1994-1999  6 
Belarus 1995-2003  9 
Belgium 1978-2004  27 
Bolivia 1986-2003  18 
Brazil 1980-1994  15 
Bulgaria 1991-2004  14 
Canada 1979-2004  26 
Chile 1974-1988,  1992-2004 28 
Colombia 1974-198  13 
Croatia 1994-2004  11 
Czech Republic  1993-2004  12 
Denmark 1972-2004  33 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  1975-1979, 1981-1997  22 
Estonia 2000-2004  5 
Finland 1972-2004  33 
France 1978-2004  27 
Georgia 1997-2001  5 
Germany 1974-2004  31 
Greece 1980-2004  25 
Hong Kong, China  1980-2004  25 
Hungary 1981-1999  19 
Ireland 1972-2004  33 
Israel 1976-2004  29 
Italy 1980-2004  25 
Japan 1980-2004  25 
Kazakhstan 1997-2003  7 
Korea, Rep.  1980-2004  25 
Latvia 1994-2003  10 
Lithuania 1993-2004  12 
Malaysia 1996-2003  8 
Mexico 1972-2000  29 
Moldova 1997-2001  5 
Mongolia 1992-2002  11 
Netherlands 1975-2004  30 
New Zealand  1980-2004  25 
Norway 1980-2004  25 
Panama 1990-1994  5 
Peru 1990-2003  14 37 
 
Poland 1994-2000  7 
Portugal 1980-2004  25 
Romania 1990-2004  15 
Singapore 1972-2004  33 
Slovak Republic  1996-2004  9 
Slovenia 1990-2004  15 
South Africa  1977-2004  28 
Spain 1980-2004  25 
Sweden 1978-2004  27 
Switzerland 1977-2004  28 
Thailand 1972-2002  31 
Ukraine 1999-2003  5 
United Kingdom  1973-2004  32 
United States  1980-2004  25 
Zimbabwe 1977-1991  15 
 
Table A2 Summary Statistics 
Variable 
No. of 
observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation Min  Max 
Age dependency  1108  16.76074  6.508216  5.48  29.33 
Real Income Growth per 
Capita 1108  5.579003  4.605773  -30.99  23.52 
Life Expectancy at Birth  1108  72.88641  5.846744  44.61  82.03 
Private Savings (% of 
GDP) 1108  23.71485  7.419446  -6.50  50.78 
Public Savings (% of 
GDP) 1108  -0.94044  4.607695  -19.83  15.37 
 
Table A3 Panel ADF Test 
Variable 
Exogenous Variable(s) Used in 
Test 
Fisher Chi Square 
Test Statistic  p value 
Age dependency  Intercept, Trend  233.674  0.000 
GDP Per Capita, PPP  Intercept, Trend  106.102  0.587 
Growth Intercept  316.608  0.000 
Life Expectancy  Intercept, Trend  268.396  0.000 
Private Savings  Intercept  181.263  0.000 
Public Savings  Intercept  227.424  0.000 
 
Null Hypothesis: Unit Root. Growth is first difference of GDP Per Capita, PPP 38 
 
Table A4 Estimation Results with Reduction of the Instrument Set 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
 
Private savings 
“collapsed” 
Public savings 
“collapsed”  Private savings  Public savings 
  
Long-run 
coefficient  
Long-run 
coefficient  
Long-run 
coefficient  
Long-run 
coefficient 
Lagged private savings 
0.358*** 
(0.0871)     
0.642*** 
(0.1085)      
Lagged public savings    
0.765*** 
(0.0430)     
0.787*** 
(0.0413)   
Lagged income growth 
-0.015*** 
(0.0489) 
-0.023 
(0.078) 
0.030 
(0.0206) 
0.127 
(0.094) 
0.027 
(0.0407) 
0.076 
(0.116) 
0.003 
(0.0259) 
0.013 
(0.122) 
Public savings 
-0.671*** 
(0.0998) 
-1.045*** 
(0.270)    
-0.440*** 
(0.0887) 
-1.228** 
(0.564)    
Age dependency 
-0.315*** 
(0.1218) 
-0.491** 
(0.214) 
-0.047*** 
(0.0183) 
-0.202** 
(0.095) 
-0.196*** 
(0.0765) 
-0.548** 
(0.319) 
-0.044** 
(0.0191) 
-0.209** 
(0.109) 
Life expectancy 
0.275*** 
(0.0466) 
0.428*** 
(0.121) 
0.005 
(0.0046) 
0.023 
(0.021) 
0.154*** 
(0.0448) 
0.431** 
(0.250) 
0.007 
(0.0045) 
0.034 
(0.023) 
90% confidence interval for long-run 
coefficient for public savings  [-1.490, -0.601] 
 
[-2.157, -0.298]   
J statistic H0: Surplus moment conditions 
are valid  50.32 52.64 51.90  52.43 
AR(2) test p value H0: No 2
nd order 
autocorrelation  0.225 0.126 0.279  0.118 
No. of observations  1046 1046 1046  1046 
No. of instruments  99 66  189  126 
 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
***Significant at 1% level of significance. **Significant at 5% level of significance. *Significant at 10% level of significance. 